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Parental Tort Liability for
Preimplantation Genetic Interventions:
Technological Harms, the Social Model of
Disability, and Questions of Identity
KIRSTEN RABE SMOLENSKY*
I wrote Creating Children with Disabilities: Parental Tort Liability
for Preimplantation Genetic Interventions' because I was puzzled by the
dearth of literature on potential parental tort liability for
preimplantation genetic interventions,2 and I wanted to spark an
academic discussion on the topic. Therefore, I am extraordinarily pleased
and honored that the Hastings Law Journal graciously agreed to publish
and host a Symposium on this topic, and that Professors Glenn Cohen,3
Jaime King,4 and Alicia Ouellette' were willing to engage in the
discussion. Their thoughtful commentary has both challenged and
advanced my proposal in numerous ways, and I am fortunate to have
been aided by scholars who are both so wise and kind.
In the original article, I conclude that under current tort doctrine,
parental tort liability is unlikely to result in a vast majority of cases
because of Parfit's Non-Identity Problem.6 But in certain cases, where
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I. Kirsten Rabe Smolensky, Creating Children with Disabilities: Parental Tort Liability for
Preimplantation Genetic Interventions, 6o HASTINGS L.J. 299 (2008).
2. Even in entire books dedicated to the topic of preimplantation or prenatal genetic
interventions, parental liability is ignored or barely mentioned. See generally DAVID HEYD, GENETICS:
MORAL ISSUES IN THE CREATION OF PEOPLE (1992); PRENATAL TESTING AND DISABILITY RIGHTS (Erik
Parens & Adrienne Asch eds., 2000). JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE
NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECIINOLOGIES (1994); ROSAMUND ScoTT, CHOOSING BETWEEN POSSIBLE LIVES: LAw
AND ETHICS OF PRENATAL AND PREIMPLANTATION GENETIC DIAGNOSIS (2007).
3. 1. Glenn Cohen, Intentional Diminishment, the Non-Identity Problem, and Legal Liability, 6o
HASTINGS L.J. 347 (2008).
4. Jaime King, Duty to the Unborn: A Response to Smolensky, 6o HASTINGS L.J. 377 (2008).
5. Alicia R. Ouellette, Insult to Injury: A Disability-Sensitive Response to Smolensky's Call for
Parental Tort Liability for Preimplantation Genetic Interventions, 6o HASTINGS L.J. 397 (2008).
6. DEREK PARFrr, REASONS AND PERSONS 351-79 (rev. ed. 1987). The Non-Identity Problem
[4i]
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parents intentionally engage in direct genetic interventions, such as gene
modification, alteration, or deletion, for the purpose of producing a child
with a disability, the resulting later-born child is harmed and should have
a valid tort claim.
The debate over the possibility and wisdom of parental liability for
preimplantation genetic interventions will hardly be settled here. To
move the conversation forward, I will respond to several broad themes
that appear in the responses: questions about whether parental tort
liability is the best vehicle for solving problems of intentional
diminishment,7 concerns that the article fails to account for all of the
costs (for example, the technological risks associated with assisted
reproductive technologies (ARTs)) and benefits (for example, the
benefits of growing up deaf in a deaf family) of being born with a
disabling trait created by a preimplantation genetic intervention, and the
possibility that the Non-Identity Problem precludes parental tort liability
in all preimplantation situations. For each theme, I will respond directly
to the commentary that most developed it. Like my commentators, I will
focus on the claim that a parent should be liable to her child in tort
where she intentionally engages in a direct preimplantation genetic
intervention that creates a child with a disabling trait. For purposes of
8continuity, I will use the core illustration of deafness.
I. CALLS FOR REGULATION AND PROVIDER LIABILITY Do NOT SOLVE THE
PROBLEM OF PARENTAL TORT LIABILITY
Professors King and Ouellette suggest that parental tort liability is
not the best solution to the intentional creation of children with
disabilities, instead calling for regulation of ARTs, or provider liability.9 I
did not mean to suggest in my article that regulation or provider liability
suggests that children conceived and born as a result of negligence, for example a negligent tubal
ligation that results in pregnancy, have no tort claim. As the child would not have existed but for the
defendant's negligent act, he suffers no injury. Id.
7. While I use the term "intentional diminishment" in the original article, I do not define it. See
Smolensky, supra note I, at 308. Professor Cohen, however, adopts this term exclusively in his
response and defines it as "intentionally using reproductive technology to produce a child who is on
balance significantly harmed as compared to the 'normal' child (think of 'diminishment' as the
antonymic concept to 'enhancement,' which is often discussed in the bioethics literature)." Cohen,
supra note 3, at 349. While I agree substantially with his definition, he recognizes intentional
diminishment to include preimplantation selection decisions. I would not. Instead, I would only use
the term in reference to direct genetic interventions; only in these situations are capabilities associated
with "normal" genes actually diminished.
8. Although many examples might be appropriate, I will use the example of a child who is deaf,
both because it is the example used most frequently in the literature and because all of the responses
have consistently referenced this example.
9. King, supra note 4, at 392-95 (arguing that regulation is the best solution); Ouellette. supra
note 5, at 398 n.3 (suggesting that tort liability should lie with medical professionals and ART
facilities); id. at 410 (hoping that "resulting policy," which I take to mean regulation, "will protect
children").
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was either impossible or undesirable. And I agree with Professors King
and Ouellette that parental tort liability is not necessarily the best
method, at least standing alone, for deterring ethically problematic
preimplantation parental behavior." Yet, even if regulation and provider
tort liability were widespread, questions about potential parental tort
liability would likely still exist. Therefore, it makes sense for legal
academia to consider these questions now.
There are certainly advantages (and disadvantages) to the regulation
of ARTs, and others have written on this topic extensively." For
purposes of the subject I have raised, however, I am relatively agnostic as
to whether there should be regulation. Depending upon the way a
particular statute is written it may expand,'3 limit,'4 or preclude'5 tort
liability. But in many cases, regulation will have little effect on the
operation of tort cases. Therefore, while regulation aimed at preventing
certain preimplantation genetic interventions is apt to reduce the number
io. In fact, some countries have done just this. For example, the United Kingdom recently passed
an amendment to the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act of 199o, which prohibits the selection
of pre-embryos with a disabling trait when nonaffected pre-embryos are available:
Persons or embryos that are known to have a gene, chromosome or mitochondrion
abnormality involving a significant risk that a person with the abnormality will have or
develop-
(a) a serious physical or mental disability,
(b) a serious illness, or
(c) any other serious medical condition,
must not be preferred to those that are not known to have such an abnormality.
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 2008, c. 22, § 14(4) (Eng.) (amending Human Fertilisation
and Embryology Act, 199o, c. 37 (Eng.)).
ii. Smolensky, supra note i, at 306 n.39 (recognizing potential provider tort liability); id. at 311-
12 (recognizing other scholarly proposals aimed at regulating parental behaviors). Most likely, the best
solution is a combination of regulation and tort liability.
12. See, e.g., Lori B. Andrews & Nanette Elster, Regulating Reproductive Technologies, 21 J.
LEGAL MED. 35, 44-46 (20OO); George J. Annas et al., Protecting the Endangered Human: Toward an
International Treaty Prohibiting Cloning and Inheritable Alterations, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 151, 162-65
(2002); Angela Campbell, A Place for Criminal Law in the Regulation of Reproductive Technologies,
Io HEALTH L.J. 77, IOO-Os (2002); Judith F. Daar, Regulating Reproductive Technologies: Panacea or
Paper Tiger?, 34 Hous. L. REv. 6o9, 637-56 (1997) (surveying current and proposed legal regulation of
ART); Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, The "Orwellian Nightmare" Reconsidered: A Proposed Regulatory
Framework for the Advanced Reproductive Technologies, 25 GA. L. REV. 625, 687-89 (199i); Stuart
Hogarth et al., Closing the Gap-Enhancing the Regulation of Genetic Tests Using Responsive
Regulation, 62 FooD & DRUG L.J. 831, 833 (2007); see also Smolensky, supra note i, at 306 (briefly
discussing some of the disadvantages of regulation).
13. The Federal Employers' Liability Act ("FELA") can be viewed in this light. 42 U.S.C. §§ 51-
60 (2oo6); DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 133 (2ooo) ("By express terms or by implication," some
statutes may create "a new claim or cause of action not recognized at common law.").
14. Statutes can limit tort liability by creating "new defenses to common law tort claims or
enact[ing] a lower standard of care for some activities." DOBBS, supra note 13, § 225.
15. Tort liability is generally only precluded where there is federal preemption. "A federal statute
may set rules of conduct and create a federal remedy, administrative or otherwise, and at the same
time preempt or exclude ordinary state tort law." Id.
6. Id. (discussing the various ways that regulation can affect tort law).
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of cases that a court hears, because of its deterrence effects, it probably
will not completely eliminate all tort claims."
Provider liability might also be preferable to parental tort liability. It
targets those who control access to ART-the physicians, fertility clinics,
and laboratories. And provider liability also has the ancillary benefit of
providing a defendant with deeper pockets than his parents might have.
But provider liability also has its problems. Provider liability shifts
the focus from parent to provider, and implicitly suggests that the moral
actor in these preimplantation situations is the provider and not the
parent. Given the current debate about the role of conscience in the
practice of medicine,' 8 it is ironic that some might gladly make physicians
liable in tort for providing ethically problematic services in the
preimplantation context and yet expect physicians to provide other
services to which the physician might have an ethical objection (for
example, abortion services). Health care providers should either be
moral agents or consumer-driven providers of health care, and it is unfair
to expect them to act as moral agents in some situations but not others.
Regardless of one's feeling on this point, provider liability does not
preclude parental tort liability given the widespread movement to
comparative fault.
Of course, there may be situations in which provider liability is
warranted. In arguing that my proposal is underinclusive, Professor King
writes that "[h]arms derived from the embryo biopsy required to conduct
PGS provide an argument for potential liability irrespective of Parfit's
Non-Identity Problem, as those embryos existed and could have been
transferred without the removal of the cell for genetic testing." 9 I wanted
to highlight this point because I think it is excellent; there is room for
some form of tort liability here. In my mind, however, this potential
liability is that of the physician and not the parents.
The technological risk of harm in ART procedures is similar to the
risks that a patient accepts when she undergoes a medical procedure. The
physician (or other health professional) performing the procedure has
special knowledge about the risks associated with the procedure. Those
risks must be communicated to the patient, and a physician's failure to
17. Given the relatively small number of preimplantation tort cases one might expect without
regulation of ARTs, some readers may think that regulation will effectively eliminate any tort claims
(i.e., that regulation is likely to push low numbers to zero). But, regulation is never loo% effective.
One exception might be situations where a federal statute preempts state tort law. Id.
18. See Robin F. Wilson, The Limits of Conscience: Moral Clashes over Deeply Divisive
Healthcare Procedures, 34 Am. J.L. & MED. 41, 45-52 (2008) (providing an overview of the debate and
the history of conscience in medicine); accord Maxine Harrington, The Ever-Expanding Health Care
Conscience Clause: The Quest for Immunity in the Struggle Between Professional Duties and Moral
Beliefs, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 779, 783-800 (2007).
i9. King, supra note 4, at 386.
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give the patient appropriate information relevant to his decision to
undergo a procedure does and should result in malpractice liability."
Preimplantation interventions are no different. Tort law would not find a
patient contributorily negligent for undergoing a medical procedure that
his physician offered. Instead, if a known, serious risk manifested itself
the patient would bear the burden of that harm. If a serious risk that the
patient was not informed of manifested itself, the patient would have a
claim in tort against his provider." While pre-embryos cannot give
informed consent to medical procedures, this fact does not negate the
provider's duty to inform parents of the technological risks associated
with the relevant procedures. Further, I am not aware of any cases where
children have successfully sued their parents for giving consent to a
medical procedure performed by a medical provider. For these reasons,
provider liability may lie where physicians and other medical providers
fail to provide appropriate information to the parents about the risks
associated with ARTs.
II. DETERMINING HARM: BALANCING ALL OF THE RELEVANT COSTS AND
BENEFITS
All three commentators suggest that my article does not fully
account for all of the benefits (for example, the benefits of growing up
deaf in a deaf family") and perhaps all of the costs (for example, the risks
of technological harm created by ART procedures 3) associated with
preimplantation genetic interventions. I address the latter of these
concerns first.
A. THE COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE RISK OF TECHNOLOGICAL HARM
My article implicitly disregards any risk of technological harm from
the use of ART techniques. As Professor King notes, there is limited
information about the scope and severity of these technological risks, but
it is probably true that not all ART techniques are harmless. 4 It is
20. Informed consent cases are sometimes brought as battery claims, for example, where "the
operation performed was different from the one to which the patient consented." DOBBS, supra note
13, § 225. But in instances where the patient receives inadequate information, they are brought as
negligence claims. Id.
21. Id.
22. Cohen, supra note 3, at 349; King, supra note 4, at 388; Ouellette, supra note 5, at 401.
23. King, supra note 4, at 383-84 (detailing the risks associated with high-order multiple embryo
transfers and pregnancies, pre-embryo biopsy, and "gene therapy"). I prefer the term "genetic
engineering" to "gene therapy" because gene therapy implies the use of a gene addition, alteration, or
deletion that improves substandard physiological functioning to a level considered "normal" for the
human species. Genetic engineering could be used to create genetic enhancements (for example,
increased intelligence, strength, or athletic abilities beyond that considered "normal"), therapeutic
functioning (such as that sought after in gene therapy), or intentional diminishments (for example,
deafness, blindness, or mental capacity below that considered "normal").
24. Id. at 383.
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probably also true that some ART techniques may be quite harmful.
Discussing indirect genetic interventions, King argues that "[t]he known
and unknown risks of embryo biopsy should be weighed against the
benefit of being able to select between embryos. In cases of selecting for
an embryo with a disabling trait, establishing a benefit significant enough
to outweigh the risk of the procedure will be difficult." 5 She makes
similar arguments in the context of direct genetic interventions, arguing
that "courts should consider the medical risks of undertaking the
procedures" as doing so "broadens the scope of parental tort liability for
preimplantation interventions."26
It seems to me that a large portion of her concern is about the limits
of procreative liberty, and not the appropriate calculation of embryonic
harm. If this is true, then I agree that when deciding whether parents'
should be able to select for or modify any genetic trait, we must consider,
among other things, the benefits of having that choice against the risks to
any resulting offspring. The technological risks of ART may very well
limit preimplantation genetic interventions for any purpose, and such an
analysis is vital to determining the limits of procreative liberty.
Professor King may also be suggesting that given the potential
technological harms from preimplantation genetic interventions, fewer
kinds of selections or modifications (perhaps only those that are
therapeutic or enhancing) should be allowed. The corollary to this
argument is that the more borderline cases under my proposal should be
considered harmful if you take into account the risk of technological
harm; therefore, my proposal is underinclusive. While it is true that
considering the risk of technological harms may shift the line between
harm and benefit in any particular, real-life case, considering the risks of
technological harm is unnecessary when comparing particular selections
or modifications in relative terms. This is because the risk from
technological harm cancels out.
The technological risks associated with in vitro fertilization (IVF)
and preimplantation genetic diagnosis and screening (PGD and PGS) are
no different for the later-born child if parents are selecting pre-embryos
based on the presence or absence of a particular gene.27 Regardless of
whether a parent is selecting for or against a particular gene, all eggs and
pre-embryos undergo the same IVF procedures, and all pre-embryos are
25. Id. at 386.
26. Id. at 387.
27. The technological risk to the later-born child is the risk associated with the embryo biopsy.
Once the embryo is biopsied it can be tested for the presence or absence of any particular gene. This
genetic testing affects only the removed cell, and not the rest of the embryo. Hence, the risk associated
with the biopsy in both cases is the same.
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biopsied.,8 All later-born children, therefore, face the same risk of
technological harm.
The same may also be true of direct genetic modifications, but it is
difficult to say since the technology does not yet exist. It may be that
adding a gene creates more risks for the later-born child than deleting a
gene. Or, it may be that adding gene A creates more risks than adding
gene B. We simply do not know. Therefore, I assumed that the risk of
technological harm to the later-born child remained constant in these
situations as well. Of course, it very well may be the case that the
technological risks associated with direct genetic interventions are
significant enough that all direct genetic interventions, regardless of
whether they are therapeutic, enhancing, or diminishing, should be
prohibited.
While I think the risk of technological harms generally cancels out
when comparing decisions involving similar genetic interventions,
Professor King is right that there may be situations where the
technological risks make a difference.29 For example, the technological
risks may make a difference where parents could conceive naturally and
yet choose IVF and genetic manipulation solely because they wish to
create a child with a disability.3" In these instances, the technological risks
may not cancel out, but rather add to any harm associated with the
disabling genetic trait. Conversely, technological risks may reduce the
perceived benefits of selecting for or creating "normal" or enhancing
traits.3
B. THE BENEFITS OF GROWING UP DEAF IN A DEAF FAMILY
All of the commentators note the potential benefits of growing up
deaf in a deaf family. So did many of my colleagues in commenting on
earlier drafts of the original article. Yet, I am particularly indebted to
Professor Ouellette for her clear discussion of the social model of
disability, and her well-articulated concern that the article "employs a
medical model of disability in which a child born with deafness or
28. It is true that some eggs or sperm may be retrieved and stored using different techniques and
protocols. It is also true that some conceptuses may be cultured in different media or that some pre-
embryos may be biopsied in slightly different ways, etc. Some of these techniques may be more
harmful than others. But then the risk one is concerned about is the risk of harm associated with the
technique; there is no technological risk of harm associated with the choice between embryos.
29. King, supra note 4, at 383-87.
30. Some literature suggests that PGD and PGS should not be used except where parents are
unable to conceive naturally.
31. For example, if the benefits of hearing are ten and the costs of the technological risks are two,
then the actual benefit obtained by a technologically created hearing child is eight, not ten. The use of
these numbers is not meant to imply that these things have readily determinable values; they do not.
Rather, they are used for illustrative purposes.
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dwarfism is a damaged good with limited life options."32 Her response,
however, suggests that the open future approach may lead to conclusions
which I did not intend. I found this particularly troublesome, since I
agree with the vast majority of Professor Ouellette's arguments.
Professor Ouellette fairly suggests that some of the language in my
article was consistent with the medical model of disability.33 What
Professor Ouellette's commentary has forced me to see is that I made an
important but unstated underlying assumption: that a large portion of the
harm caused by a disabling trait is due to environmental factors and that
these environmental factors are not changing rapidly enough to alleviate
harm caused by a disabling trait. While some may view this assumption
as pessimistic, and perhaps counterproductive,34 I think that it is, if
nothing else, realistic. Here, I make some tentative arguments about how
this assumption may reconcile an open future approach and a social
model of disability.
I did not define "disability" in the original article because I feared
that defining the term might inappropriately limit or expand parental tort
liability. It seems to me that most, if not all, traits defined as disabilities
under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") should be
considered legally cognizable injuries.35 But it also seems to me that other
traits not defined as disabilities might limit a child's future opportunities.
Given these concerns, I thought that a case-by-case analysis might be
more appropriate and consistent with current tort doctrine. Yet, to
respond adequately to Professor Ouellette's commentary, I now feel the
need to adopt some definition of disability.
There are many varying definitions of disability in the literature
even though the vast majority of academics espouse adherence to the
social model of disability. 6 In searching for a definition grounded in the
32. Ouellette, supra note 5, at 401.
33. See, e.g., Smolensky, supra note i, at 309 ("[I]f parents purposefully produce a child with
fewer capabilities, or less health, when they could produce a more healthful or capable child, there is a
presumption of harm .... "). But see id. at 332 (describing the life of a young man who is deaf as
"successful and fulfilling," but noting that he might "have more opportunities available to him if he
could hear").
34. Some readers may think that my argument is counterproductive because it allows tort law to
continue to factor in environmental harms as if they were acceptable. While this is a potential
problem, I find that a strong version of the social model of disability seems uncaring because it
sacrifices individual recovery for the purpose of serving some greater good -namely a societal change
in perception of persons with disabilities.
35. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2oo6) (defining disability as "a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual"). The interpretation of
the ADA is relatively narrow, and "in a series of ADA employment cases, courts have denied
disability status to persons with epilepsy, myopia, monocular vision, and carpal tunnel syndrome."
Dov Fox, Silver Spoons and Golden Genes: Genetic Engineering and Egalitarian Ethos, 33 AM J.L. &
MED. 567, 6io (20o7).
36. Adam M. Samaha. What Good Is the Social Model of Disability?, 74 U. CHi. L. REV. 1251,
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social model of disability, the definition that best captured my sentiment
was offered by Professor Adam Samaha: "'disability' [is] disadvantage
caused by the confluence of two factors: (i) a person's physical or mental
traits plus (2) the surrounding environment, which is at least partially
constructed by others. Both factors might be necessary before
disadvantage takes hold."37 I like this definition of disability because it
recognizes that for disadvantage (or, in my terms, harm) to occur there
must be both a particular trait and a particular environment.
Contrary to what the text of my original article may suggest in
certain areas,38 I completely agree with Professor Ouellette that a large
portion of the harm caused by a particular physical or mental trait is
often due to environmental factors. I have no doubt that "a person with a
physical impairment has the same inherent ability to lead a fulfilling life
as does anyone else."39 I also agree that inaccurate societal stereotypes
perpetuate unfair and inaccurate notions about persons with disabilities,
and lead to the maintenance and creation of societal barriers. It is these
societal barriers that account for a majority of the problems persons with
disabilities face.4" It is also true that in certain environments a trait like
deafness confers no disadvantage, and may, in fact, confer some
advantage. Perhaps growing up deaf in a deaf family is one of these
situations.
But something else is also true: environmental factors are not
changing rapidly enough to alleviate the harm caused by a trait such as
deafness. Because of this unfortunate fact, children born today (and
probably during the next several decades) will suffer disadvantage
(harm) in society if they are born deaf. Therefore, it seems to me that
where parents engage in direct genetic interventions to create a child
who is deaf they have de facto harmed that child regardless of his or her
familial circumstances.
In saying this I do not mean any insult.' I am simply imagining a tort
case in today's world, and trying to be realistic about the challenges that




38. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
39. Ouellette, supra note 5, at 401. In fact, I note this in my article. Smolensky, supra note i, at
332 (noting that the sixteen-year-old boy whose DNA was altered to make him deaf was "living a
successful and fulfilling life").
40. I also recognize, as Professor Cohen points out, that "deafness... still prevent[s] access to
goods made possible only by sound-enjoyment of a violin concerto by Tchaikovsky, for example."
Cohen, supra note 3, at 350 n.8.
41. Thank you to Professor Ouellette for recognizing this. Ouellette, supra note 5, at 402.
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This view is also consistent with current tort doctrine.42 Tort law
compensates persons who become disabled as a result of another
person's tortious conduct. In calculating damages, courts consider not
just compensatory damages associated with "all losses that have
proximately result from the tort," including pain and suffering, but lost
earning capacity and "reasonable charges for diagnostic tests, drugs,
medical devices and artificial limbs used. 43 Many of these damages are
created by the environment in which the person lives. For example, if
society was better at integrating persons with disabilities into society, that
person's long-term earning potential would not suffer.'
Assume for the moment that an adult was made deaf by another's
tortious conduct. His tort damages might include medical expenses, lost
wages, lost earning potential, emotional distress, and pain and suffering.
In a society without the "[a]rchitectural, attitudinal, sensory, political and
economic barriers [that] prevent people with disabilities from full
participation in society," his damages would be reduced. 4 And we might
even expect juries to consider evidence that the plaintiff's life has been
enriched by his new disability.46 If the plaintiff's nonhearing life has
benefits that outweigh the harm suffered as a result of socially
constructed barriers, then perhaps those benefits should be weighed
against the costs of injury, and the remedy severely limited.
Similarly, in the case of a newborn who is born deaf as a result of his
parents' direct preimplantation genetic intervention, we might expect his
tort damages to be limited. Pain from the injury would be absent
(assuming physical pain in the adult's case is associated with the injury
which caused the deafness), any cognitively perceived loss would not
42. Alternatively, tort law may inherently adopt a medical model of disability which treats
disability as inherently tragic. To the extent that this is true, all tort doctrine needs to be substantially
revised to fit within a social model of disability. To my knowledge, such sweeping reform of tort law
has not been proposed. But see Wendy F. Hensel, The Disabling Impact of Wrongful Birth and
Wrongful Life Actions. 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 141, 144 (2005) (arguing that the "costs of
recognizing wrongful life and birth actions are too high" because they promote a medical model of
disability); cf. Creasy v. Rusk, 73o N.E.2d 659, 666-67 (Ind. 2000) (adopting the general view that a
person with mental disabilities should be "held to the same standard of care as that of a reasonable
person under the same circumstances without regard to the alleged tortfeasor's capacity to control or
understand the consequences of his or her actions"). In Creasy, the Indiana Supreme Court noted that
one rationale for holding persons with mental disabilities to the ordinary standard of care was a hope
that they would be "integrat[ed] into the least restrictive environment." Id. at 666.
43. DOBBS, supra note 13, § 377.
44. Some readers might argue that this comparison is inaccurate because a person who is made
deaf by the tortious actions of another has previously lived life as a hearing person. But, to me, the
only difference is the severity of injury. A once-hearing plaintiff might be entitled to more damages
because of his "perceivable physical pain or cognitively perceived loss" than a child who was born deaf,
but the harmful societal barriers are present in both situations. Smolensky, supra note I, at 335.
45. Ouellette, supra note 5, at 401.
46. One might argue that this will never happen because it is too risky a tactic for defense counsel
to take. If this is the case, though, it supports my argument about the slow pace of attitudinal barriers.
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exist, and the harms associated with societal barriers would disappear. In
this world, direct genetic interventions that create a disabling trait might
not be actionable because there would be no harm.
But, this is not the world that we live in. The societal barriers that
persons with disabilities face are still enormous. Given that the
eradication of these barriers is not imminent, I do not think it
unreasonable to conclude that where parents intentionally create a child
with a disability they have harmed that child regardless of any other
mitigating factors.
III. THE HUMAN DIGNITY APPROACH
As an alternative to the open future approach that I suggest,
Professor Ouellette offers a "disability-sensitive" approach that I will
refer to as the human dignity approach. In describing the goals of her
approach, Professor Ouellette writes:
The key to identifying cognizable injury without singling out
disability as a uniquely tragic trait is to ask whether adding, deleting, or
modifying an embryo's DNA to produce the parents' desired genotype
is itself a legal wrong, instead of sorting among manufactured
phenotypes to determine which constitute legally cognizable harms. In
other words, focus on the intervention, not the result of the
intervention."
I have two responses to her proposal. First, I think that the open future
approach could be viewed as disability-sensitive. Second, even if it is not
as sensitive as the human dignity approach, I believe that the human
dignity approach can only be adopted under a particular set of
restrictions.
A. THE OPEN FUTURE APPROACH AS A DISABILITY-SENSITIVE APPROACH
I think that the open future approach could be interpreted as
adhering to the social model of disability. As noted above, it is not clear
that recognizing a disability as a disadvantage (harm) falls outside the
scope of the social model of disability given the great societal barriers
present. It also seems to me that the open future approach focuses on the
interventions and not the resulting disabling trait as harmful (although,
perhaps not as elegantly or precisely as it should). This point is illustrated
most clearly where I note that "[u]nder an objective standard of offense,
the creation of genetic traits such as deafness or achondroplasia are
almost certain to be considered offensive to a reasonable sense of
personal dignity.""t Professor Ouellette cites this portion of my text and
47. Ouellette, supra note 5, at 407 (footnote omitted).
48. Smolensky, supra note I, at 319-20. While I use examples of physical disabilities here, this
statement is meant to apply to mental disabilities as well. It would, in my estimation, be just as
accurate to say that most people would be offended if they were unconscious and another person
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suggests that my analysis "singles out physical disability as 'offensive to a
reasonable sense of personal dignity."' 49 I think this language actually
suggests a different conclusion.
This is an area where the language of tort law is not as precise as it
could be. Yet, I would like to advance a few arguments for why "the
creation of genetic traits such as deafness or achondroplasia," and not the
condition itself, is "offensive to a reasonable sense of personal dignity. 50
First, the words "harmful" and "offensive" are adjectives, and therefore
presumably meant to describe the type of contact and not the resulting
harm or injury. Although tort doctrine does not parse out the language
this carefully (most scholars discussing dual intent talk simply about the
intent to harm as I did in several instances"1 ), such a conclusion does not
seem unreasonable. In fact, I think most tort scholars, if pressed, would
agree that it is not the bruised ego or shattered skull that is offensive to a
reasonable sense of personal dignity, but rather the touch that
occasioned the bruised ego or shattered skull. This is why plaintiffs may
get nominal damages for battery even if they do not suffer a physical
injury.
B. THE HUMAN DIGNITY APPROACH CAN ONLY FUNCTION WELL WITH
CERTAIN RESTRICTIONS
Professor Ouellette proposes a human dignity approach where "the
intentional manipulation of a child's DNA to create a trait chosen by a
parent.., is a harmful or offensive contact."52 Under her approach, "the
manipulation causes moral harm, an injury to identity, and lost
opportunities for the future child.... It is of no moment that the contact
with the child's DNA was intended to enhance the child."53 The problem
with this approach is that it makes parents liable for all preimplantation
genetic modifications, regardless of whether the modification was
therapeutic, enhancing, or diminishing.54 This, I think, is problematic.
If technology improves, there may be very good reasons to allow
parents to engage in direct genetic interventions to the same extent that
we might allow parents to consent to certain medical procedures on
behalf of their living children. With living children, the law allows
lowered their 10 by forty points or caused them to develop schizophrenia.
49. Ouellette, supra note 5, at 400 (quoting Smolensky, supra note 1, at 319-20).
50. Smolensky, supra note s, at 319-20 (emphasis added).
51. Id. at 320 (using phrases such as "with the intent of harming his or her later-born child" and
"subjectively intends to harm their later-born child").
52. Ouellette, supra note 5, at 408.
53. Id.
54. This seems to be the stance taken by certain international documents, which call for a right to
an unaltered genome. See, e.g., The Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights.
UNESCO, 29th Sess., 29 CJRes. i6 (Nov. is, 1997), adopted by G.A. Res. 53/152, U.N. Doc
AIRES/5 3/15 2 (Dec. 9, 1998).
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parents to give consent to procedures that are therapeutic (for example,
tonsillectomies, chemotherapy, or surgery to fix hip dysplasia) 5
Sometimes, parents are even able to give consent to procedures that are
enhancing (for example, cosmetic procedures such as ear tucks and
braces to straighten teeth) 6 But, to my knowledge, parents generally are
not allowed to consent to medical procedures that might confer some
serious disadvantage.
It is not clear to me, assuming that the technology is safe and
effective, why preimplantation genetic interventions should be treated
differently. If I am right about this, then I think current convention
requires us to make choices about which genetic modifications are
potentially harmful. Thanks to Professor Ouellette's comments I
understand the need to be more explicit about the source of harm where
a disabling trait is at issue. While I still feel that certain disabling traits
may be de facto harms given current societal barriers, I am hopeful that
discussions like this may persuade others to examine the intersection of
tort law and disability rights.
IV. THE NON-IDENTITY PROBLEM REVISITED
Professor Cohen writes a fascinating two-part response. While much
of what he says is quite interesting, I will focus solely on the first part in
which he argues that "Smolensky's argument entails a broad
extinguishing of tort liability, barring suit by the child against any person
(parent, doctor, etc.) for any culpability based on any preimplantation
act or omission that leads to diminishment."57 This conclusion is based on
the idea that any person-affecting conception of harm necessarily raises
the Non-Identity Problem in the preimplantation context, and that the
Non-Identity Problem necessarily precludes tort liability. His arguments
seem to focus on what it means for an entity's identity to persist through
time.58 I respond to these claims by arguing that an identity does not need
to persist through time for liability to attach. Indeed a particular entity
need not even exist at the time of the injury-causing event for tort
liability to lie.
In the original article, I argue that the Non-Identity Problem is
irrelevant where parents engage in direct genetic interventions. 9 Some of
my initial thoughts for this conclusion center on the idea that any direct
55. See, e.g., Leonard H. Glantz, Research with Children, 24 AM. J.L. & MED. 213, 219-20 (1998);
Alicia Ouellette, Growth Attenuation, Parental Choice, and the Rights of Disabled Children: Lessons
from the Ashley X Case, 8 Hous. J. HEALTH L. & PoL'Y (forthcoming Jan. 2009) (manuscript at i, on
file with author).
56. See sources cited supra note 55-
57. Cohen, supra note 3, at 359.
58. See id. at 355-57.
59. Smolensky, supra note I, at 331-36.
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preimplantation genetic intervention "changes an already existing set of
DNA and, arguably, changes the resulting person's identity."6, I pre-
occupy myself, albeit briefly, with the relationship between genetics and
identity.
Professor Cohen's response picks up on this line of inquiry and
develops it significantly. He also considers several genetic modifications,
for example, one which adds a Marilyn Monroe beauty mark to a later-
born child,6' and one in a region of DNA which produces no phenotypic
change.62 Ultimately, he concludes that it is too difficult to determine
which genetic modifications are identity preserving and why.63 For the
most part, I agree.
Professor Cohen also makes an argument that the preservation of
personal identity requires either "psychological continuity through
memory or "a lesser requirement of continuity of 'consciousexperiences. ' ' 61 Since "one could [not] have conscious experiences before
6o. Id. at 333.
6i. Cohen, supra note 3, at 358. I am less certain than Professor Cohen that adding a beauty mark
does not change one's identity. If beauty marks are readily associated with sex symbols (for example,
Marilyn Monroe or Cindy Crawford), then having a beauty mark may change one's identity because it
changes the way a person perceives herself and the way others perceive her. Of course, whether this is
true is probably "unproveable and unfalsefiable." Id. at 359.
62. Id. at 358 n.34. I agree with Professor Cohen that this is a perfect example of a genetic
modification that does not change personal identity.
63. Id. at 359. This may be particularly true given new scientific findings. For example, scientists
have recently discovered that identical twins, which were once thought to have identical genomes,
frequently possess a different number of copies of particular gene segments. C.E. Bruder et al.,
Phenotypically Concordant and Discordant Monozygotic Twins Display Different DNA Copy-
Number-Variation Profiles, 82 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 763 (2008); accord 'Identical' Twins? Not
According to Their DNA: Minor Genetic Differences Help Explain Why Twins Aren't Exact Replicas,
MSNBC, Feb. 21, 2008, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/23276953/ ("For instance, one twin might be
missing a segment, or possess more copies of that segment than the other twin. Such variations could
explain why one identical twin can suffer from a disorder while the other remains healthy."). Other
phenotypic differences in monozygotic twins are attributable to epigenetic differences, for example the
rate at which an embryos' DNA is demethylated. TOM STRACHAN & ANDREW P. READ, HUMAN
MOLECULAR GENETICS 294-98, 469 (3d ed. 2004). Preimplantation Embryo Demethylation does not
change the DNA sequence, just gene expression. Id. Yet, epigenetic differences can result in widely
varying phenotypes. Id.
64. Cohen, supra note 3, at 355.
65. ld. at 356. Professor Cohen discusses at length what constitutes psychological continuity
through memory. Id. at 355-58. To prove this point Professor Cohen writes:
Smolensky seems to also gesture, offhandedly, at a different kind of argument. In explaining
her position she observes that "[w]hile deafening a hearing child may cause the child to
have different life experiences, it does not create a different person." . . . [R]ejecting her
position leaves us in a still more problematic position: it implies that there ought also to be
no harm if we deafened an adult. . . because that would create a new identity who could
only exist because the old identity ceased to be. That conclusion is absurd ....
Id. at 355 (quoting Smolensky, supra note I, at 334) (footnote omitted). Cohen further writes, "[O]ne
might argue that the intervention in the adult case is identity preserving, but because of a different
basis for the continuity of identity, for present purposes let us call it psychological continuity through
memory." Id.
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one had even a primitive nervous system, there does not seem to be this
kind of continuity between one's adult self and one's pre-embryonic
self., 66 Based on this line of reasoning, he argues that the identity of the
pre-embryo (if it can even be said to have an identity) 67 does not persist
into childhood, and therefore, a later-born child cannot be said to have
been harmed by something that happened to it as a pre-embryo. While
both lines of inquiry are interesting, neither seems to preclude tort
liability.
The questions of which genetic manipulations are identity preserving
and whether the preservation of personal identity requires psychological
continuity or something slightly less are questions that focus on the
persistence problem. The persistence problem asks, "What does it take
for a person to persist from one time to another-that is, for the same
person to exist at different times?" 6 In other words, is the pre-embryonic
entity that undergoes a genetic alteration the same person (or does it
share the same personal identity) as the resulting later-born child?
Assume, for the sake of argument, that the answer is no.69 This
conclusion does not preclude liability. One might also argue that liability
is not available for the later-born child because it is not a person at the
time of the genetic alteration. This concern also does not preclude tort
liability.
[T]ort law does not generally distinguish between harms caused after
birth, prenatally or prior to conception for purposes of stating a cause
of action. As long as the alleged negligent action causes a born-alive
child to suffer a legally cognizable harm, a tort injury will be
recognized even if the injury was suffered prior to the achievement of
legal personhood. °
Born-alive children have been allowed to pursue a wide variety of
prenatal negligence claims, even where the alleged negligent act
happened prior to the development of a primitive nervous system." In
66. Id. at 357.
67. Id. at 357 n.32 (suggesting that the pre-embryo cannot have an identity that persists because it
is not a person).
68. Edward T. Olson, Personal Identity, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N.
Zalta et al. eds., rev. ed. 2o08), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/#i.
69. There are some views that would allow an affirmative answer.
70. Smolensky, supra note I, at 335 (footnotes omitted).
71. Id. at 324; see also Snyder v. Michael's Stores, Inc., 945 P.2d 781, 791 (Cal. 1997) (holding that
a born-alive child could sue for injuries incurred when child's mother inhaled toxic fumes on the job
while pregnant); Bailey v. Khoury, 891 So.2d 1268. 1281 (La. 2005) (holding that an infant had a cause
of action against a physician who prescribed medication to its mother but failed to warn her of the
risks of becoming pregnant while taking the drug); Payton v. Abbott Labs, 437 N.E.2d i71, 19o (Mass.
1982) (holding that women who were harmed because their mothers took diethylstilbestrol (DES)
while pregnant could maintain a cause of action); Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Rankin, 367 P.2d 835,
837-38 (Wash. 1962) (holding that an infant had a cause of action against its mother's physician when
he failed to diagnose and medicate the mother for anemia during pregnancy, a condition that
ultimately harmed the fetus).
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some jurisdictions, later-born children have even been allowed to pursue
claims for harm resulting from preconception negligence.72 Some of these
cases involve genetic changes.73
Requiring psychological continuity in tort law would bar all
preconception tort claims and all prenatal tort claims prior to "'the last
two or three months of a normal pregnancy, when neural activity, which
is associated with rudimentary subjective experience, first occurs in a
fetus's brain."'74 Psychological continuity might also bar the tort claims of
severely mentally disabled persons or persons with Alzheimer's disease.
If psychological continuity were always required in tort law, I fear that
many meritorious tort cases might be barred. This, I think, is
unacceptable.
The persistence question is also distinct from the Non-Identity
Problem. The Non-Identity Problem asks, "If someone lives a life that is
'worth living, is this worse for this person than if he had never existed?"75
In wrongful life cases, the Non-Identity Problem is powerful because the
defendant's negligent actions result in the birth of a child who otherwise
would not have existed. In other words, "embryonic genetic modification
does not involve a choice between living a differently-abled (or disabled)
life and nonexistence," as you might see in wrongful life cases; "it is the
choice between living a differently-abled life and living a life absent
genetic modification (... presumably one without a disability). ' 6
To frame the issue a slightly different way: in direct preimplantation
genetic interventions, as in many preconception tort cases, the claim is
not that "the negligence of the defendant causes the conception or birth
of a child who happens to be disabled," but that "the negligence of the
defendant causes the disability itself."77 In direct preimplantation genetic
intervention the parents are engaging in an act that not only causes, but
72. See generally Julie A. Greenberg, Reconceptualizing Preconception Torts, 64 TENN. L. REV.
315 997).
73. See, e.g., Jorgensen v. Meade Johnson Labs., 483 F.2d 237, 241 (ioth Cir. 1973) (allowing
later-born twins to pursue a claim against a pharmaceutical company where their mother's ingestion of
an oral contraceptive prior to their conception changed the mother's chromosomal structure,
ultimately causing their Down syndrome).
74. Cohen, supra note 3, at 356-57 (quoting Eric Rakowski, Who Should Pay for Bad Genes?, 9o
CAL. L. REV. 1345. 1383 n.65 (2002).
75. PARFIT, supra note 6, 358.
76. Smolensky, supra note i, at 334.
77. Matthew Browne, Note, Preconception Tort Law in an Era of Assisted Reproduction:
Applying a Nexus Test for Duty, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2555, 2580 (2OO1); see also Hegyes v. Unjian
Enters. Inc., 286 Cal. Rptr. 85, 88 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991). The court in Hagyes noted that:
In a "wrongful life" case, the child does not assert that the negligence of the defendant
caused the inherited or congenital abnormalities. The essence of the child's claim is that the
medical professional's breach of the applicable standard of care resulted in that child being
born to experience the pain and suffering attributable to his or her affliction.
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intentionally creates the disabling trait. Absent the parents' direct genetic
intervention, this particular embryo (if implanted) would live a life
without the disabling trait.
This last sentence may give some readers pause. What if parents
refuse to implant a pre-embryo unless they can genetically modify it to
create a later-born child who is deaf? 8 Perhaps this parental preference
(and indeed the mother's procreative liberty interest in not becoming
pregnant with the unaltered embryo) in combination with the parents'
direct genetic intervention results in the birth of a child who has a life
worth living and who otherwise would not have existed. Does this fact
situation recreate the Non-Identity Problem?
While I think much thought and careful explanation needs to go into
an adequate response, I would like to provide a very tentative answer
here. Even if this fact situation recreates the Non-Identity Problem,
which I am not sure it does, parents should not be allowed to escape
liability because they created the situation of their own volition. Just as
voluntary imbibing does not reduce the standard of care owed,79 parental
preferences should not create a situation which relieves parents of their
duty of care.
CONCLUSION
Reviewing the comments of Professors Cohen, King, and Ouellette,
and writing this reply has been an extraordinarily rewarding process. I
hope this reply clarifies and refines some of my original points, and adds
some additional insights into the possibility of parental tort liability for
direct preimplantation genetic interventions.
Even after considering all of the thoughtful commentaries, I still
believe that parental tort liability should be possible where parents
intentionally engage in direct genetic interventions designed to create a
78. On this point, Professor Cohen writes:
Suppose the deaf parents say they will only conceive a child if it can be deaf (using either
selection or genetic modification). In such a case, although the parents could have
conceived a hearing child instead (and thus their decision not to do so was wrongful
according to the non-person-affecting principle), if the legal rule prevents them from
intentionally creating a deaf child, that rule will lead them not to have any child at all, which
is not better on non-person-affecting grounds.
Cohen, supra note 3, at 362.
79. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM §12 clmt. c (2001). As the
Restatement (Third) of Torts states:
In a rare case, a person might be the victim of involuntary intoxication: the iced tea the
person is drinking may have been spiked with liquor. If the person's resulting
intoxication helps explain substandard conduct, this intoxication is taken into account in
determining whether the actor has behaved as a reasonably careful person. Ordinarily,
however, intoxication is essentially voluntary in nature.... When a person's intoxication
is voluntary, it is not considered as an excuse for the person's conduct that is otherwise
lacking in reasonable care.
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child with a disabling trait. While regulation or provider liability may
provide other, perhaps even better, avenues for curbing bad parental acts,
parental tort liability will still be an issue absent some ruling or statute
explicitly prohibiting it.
One reason for allowing tort liability in these instances is that the
later-born child has been de facto harmed. While there may be numerous
benefits to growing up with a disabling trait, such as deafness, the
environmental barriers that create disadvantage in today's society are
still great. This means that a child born with a disabling trait may have
his future limited in unfortunate ways. The open future approach
acknowledges that the harm is not the disabling trait itself, but living in a
society that limits future options for persons with certain disabling traits.
Therefore, I tentatively argue in this reply that the open future approach
applies the social model of disability.
I also continue to maintain that the Non-Identity Problem does not
prohibit tort liability in this subset of cases. Tort law does not require the
persistence of personal identity for later-born child to suffer harm.
Indeed, a particular entity need not even exist at the time of the injury-
causing event for there to be tort liability. Furthermore, direct
preimplantation genetic interventions are more similar to preconception
tort cases than to wrongful life suits. Direct preimplantation genetic
interventions (like preconception torts and some prenatal torts) involve
actions that cause the disabling trait, whereas wrongful life suits involve
actions that result in the conception and birth of a child who happens to
be disabled. The original article only proposes liability where parents
intentionally cause (indeed, create) the disabling trait. While there is
certainly more to be written on this point, as I suggest above, for now I
believe that parental tort liability is a real possibility under current tort
doctrine.
There is also the question of measuring harm. Certain fact
scenarios-for example, where parents could conceive naturally and yet
choose ART because they wish to create a child with a disability-may
pose additional harms to later-born children. But in many instances the
risk of technological harm is not particularly helpful when comparing the
relative harms and benefits of particular preimplantation genetic
modifications. In any event, if technological harm befalls a child in
addition to the harm created by the disabling trait, I believe the child
should be compensated for both harms.
Finally, I should mention that Professors Ouellette and Cohen
suggest various other theories of parental tort liability in their
commentaries. While I was not able to examine the majority of them
here, I do tend to think that tort doctrine in most, but not necessarily all
instances, will require a person-affecting conception of harm.
Nonetheless, I am hopeful that some readers may take up some of these
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theories and study them more carefully. I am very interested to see how
the literature develops in the area, and I look forward to reading more
on the topic.
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